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228 BLUMENTHAL t!. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS [57 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 26565. In Bank. Jan. 18, 1962.] 
HERMAN BLUMENTHAL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. 
THE BOARD OF Jl.IEDICAL EXAMINERS, Defend-
ant and Respondent. 
[1] Physicians-Statute Regulating Practice of Optometry.-Bus. 
& Prof. Code, § 255:2, subd. (a), relating to registered dis-
pensing opticians, discriminates between persons who have 
served the requisite five-year apprenticeship or who have been 
licensed for five years in another state and other persons 
regardless of their qualifications. To conflict with constitutional 
provisions, however, the discrimination must be actually and 
palpably unreasonable and arbitrary. 
[2] Constitutional Law - Classification - Presumptions.-When a 
legislative classification is questioned, if any state of facts 
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, there is 
a presumption of existence of that state of facts, and the 
burden of showing arbitrary action rests on the one who assails 
the classification. 
[3] ld.-Equal Protection of Laws.-So long as a statute does not 
pennit one to exercise a privilege while refusing it to another 
of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, 
it is unobjectionable. 
[4] ld.-Classification-Relation to Object of Statute.-A discrimi-
nation that bears no reasonable relation to a proper legislative 
objective is invalid. 
[5] Physicians-Statute Regulating Practice of Optometry.-Bus. 
& Prof. Code, § 2552, prescribing the requisites of an applicant 
for registration as a dispensing optician, is designed to protect 
the public from incompetent and unethical opticians, but there 
is no reasonable difference between the classes established by 
subd. (a) of that section that would justify the discrimination 
imposed. 
[1] Constitutionality of statutes and validity of regulations re-
lating to optometry, notes, 98 A.L.R. 905; 22 A.L.R.2d 939. See 
also Cal.Jur.2d, Physicians, Dentists and Other Healers of the 
Sick, § 3. 
[2J See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 277; Am.Jur., Constitu-
tional Law, § 519. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5-9, 14, 16] Physicians, § 4(3); [2] 
Constitutional Law, § 163 j [3] Constitutional Law, § 138; [4, 13] 
Constitutional Law, § 156 (4); [10, 11] Constitutional Law, § 85; 
[1:2] Constitutional La~, § 84; [15] Constitutional Law, § 64; [17] 
Physicians, § 16; [18] Criminal Law, § 1019; [19J Physicians, § 8. 
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[6] ld.-Statute Regulating Practice of Optometry.-Abuses by 
nnscmpulons physici:lns :1nd (1ispcn;<ing opticians, involving 
referrals, reba tes and other unethical means of extracting 
secret profits, justify <'orrecti\'e action by the Lcgishture, 
hut it was not reasoll:1hle for the Legi~lature to concludc, by 
cmcting Bus. & Prof. Code, § ~;)52, subd. (a), that future 
dispensing opticialls could develop a proper ethical foundation 
for their professional careers only by working under the direc-
tion of licensed dispensing opticians; there was no relation-
ship between thc experience requirements sought to be im-
posed and the legislative effort to correct ethical abuses in the 
profession. 
[7] ld.-Statute Regulating Practice of Optometry.-That portion 
of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2552, subd. (a), requiring an applicant 
for regi stration as a dispensing optician to have been licensed 
as such in another state, but requiring no particular course 
of training and imposing no standards for judging the licensing 
of other states, is an arbitrary restriction. 
[8] ld.-Statute Regulating Practice of Optometry.-The experi-
ence necessary to qualify a person to dispense optical goods, 
whatever level of expertise is demanded, is obtainable in a 
variety of ways, and Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2552, subd. (a), by 
prescribing that such experience may be obtained in only two 
ways, neither of which may reasonably be thought to be supe-
rior to others, contravenes the constitutioual requirement that 
regulatory legislation avoid arbitrary and unreasonable classifi-
cations. 
[9] ld.-Statute Regulating Practice of Optometry.-Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 2552, subd. (a), is invalid because it confers on pres· 
ently licensed di spensing' opticians the unl imited and unguided 
power to exclude from tJ~e ir profession any or all persons. 
[10] Constitutional Law- Delegation of Power-To Administra-
tive Body.-While the deleg:1tion of governmental authority 
to an administrative body is prope r in some instance~, the 
delegation of absolute leg islnti,e di scretion is not. To avoid 
such a result it is necessa ry that a delegating statute estnblish 
an ascertainable standard to g uide the administrative bod~' . 
[11] ld. - Delegation of Power - To Administrative Body.-The 
absence of ascertainable standa;'us or safeguards to guide an 
administrati,e body in th e exel'ci;<e of ueJegated power renders 
effective review of the (>xel'eise of such power impossible. 
[12] ld.-Delegation of Power.-Dl'lega teu power must be accom-
panied by suitable 5afl';;na)'(1 5 to guide its use and to protect 
against its misuse. 
[10] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutiunal Law, § 134; Am.Jur .. COD-
stitutional Law, § 238 et seq. 
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[13] Id.-Classification-Relation to Object of Statute.-'WhCll a 
statute discriminates between members or uilIcrent classcs, 
and the discrimination has no reasonable relation to the 
public health, safety and wel fare, it must fr.ll v;hethcr it in-
volves the healing ar ts or any other activity. 
[14] Physicians-St:l.tute Regulating Practice of Optometry.-The 
invalidity of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 255~, subd. (a), prescribing 
the requisites of an applicant for registration as a dispensing 
optician, does not arrect the provisions of subd. (b), which 
requires applicants to present affidavits establishing experi-
ence, good moral character and competence. The Legislature 
may require applicants for licenses as dispensing opticians to 
demonstrate that they have these qualities. 
[15] Constitutional Law - Partial Unconstitutionality-Separable 
Provisions.-The test of severability of a statute is whether 
the invalid parts of the statute can be severed from the other-
wise valid parts without des:roying the statutory scheme or 
the u ti lity of the re!"nainillg pro\· isions. 
[16] Physicians-Statute Regulating Praetice of Optometry.-AI-
though failure to conform to an unconstitutional regulation 
might under some circumstances be evidence of bad character, 
it was not so in the case of an applicant for registration as a 
dispensing optician where he did not violate Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 2552, relating to dispensing opticians, until denial of his 
application for failure to satisfy the condition that rendered 
the regulation invalid, and where the violations indicated no 
continued intention to disregard the law but rather an effort to 
establish its invalidity. 
[17] Id.-Licenses.-An applicant for a license as dispensing 
optician did not testify falsely regarding an instance of dis-
pensing without a license "\I,here the record established that he 
was, at most, confused as to the meaning of "dispensing" 
under the statute. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2552.) 
[18] Criminal Law-Judgment-Collateral Attack.-A conviction 
for violation of an unconsti tutional statute may be attacked 
collaterally. 
[19] Physicians-Licenses.-An applicant for a license as dis-
pensing optician was entitled to be licensed as such optician 
where he met the requirement of two years' experience in 
optical dispensing, and where he furnished the requisite affi-
davits attesting to his good moral character. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Ellsworth Meyer, Judge. Reversed with direc-
tions. 
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Proceeding in mandamus to compel the Board of Mcdical 
Examiners to register an applicant as a dispensing optician. 
Judgment denying writ, reversed with directions. 
Ellis J. Horvitz for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, and Philip C. Griffin, Dep-
uty Attorney General, for Defendant and Respondent. 
Athearn, Chandler & Hoffman, Walter Hoffman, Clark W. 
Maser, Richard Harrington, Wilke, Fleury & Sapunor and 
Jack M. Sapunor as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner appeals from a judgment deny-
ing his petition for a writ of mandate to compel the Board of 
Medical Examiners to register him as a dispensing optician. 
Petitioner's first application for a license, filed on or about 
March 5, 1957, was denied on April 18, 1957, because he had 
not established that he had "at least five (5) full years of 
actual experience in taking facial measurements and fitting 
and adjusting lenses or frames in an establishment or estab-
lishments of a dispensing optician registered under this chap-
ter or of a dispensing optician engaged in dispensing prior 
to the enactment of this chapter and thereafter registered, or 
who has been licensed as a dispensing optician for a period 
of five years in another state. "1 (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2552, 
subd. (a).) Petitioner's second application, filed on or about 
May 21, 1957, was denied on October 17, 1958, on the same 
ground. The board also found that petitioner had not met 
the requirement of good moral character imposed by subdivi-
sion (b) of section 2552. The basis for this finding was that 
petitioner had pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of 
'Petitioner contends that this section should be interpreted lUI permit· 
ting issuance of licenses to applicants who establish that they have been 
licensed in another state for a period of five years. This interpretation 
was adopted by the Attorney General before the enactment in 1953 of 
aaction 2553.1, which proviiled in detail for the issuance of licenses to 
applicants who have had five years' e:xperience as licensed opticians in 
another state. (16 Ops. Atty. Gen. 93, 94.) The board suggests that 
aaction 2552, properly interpreted, does not permit issuance of licenses 
to IlUch applicants, but does permit issuance of licenses to applicants who 
demonstrate five years' experience in a dispensing establishment licensed 
in California or in another state. Under either interpretation the statute 
18 IlUbject to the objections made by petitioner, and it is therefore un· 
~Wlary to decide which is correct. 
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having dispensed optical goods without a license (Bus. & Prof. 
Code, §§ 2550, 2558) on or about April 9, 1958. He was fined 
and placed on probation. In September U)58 he dispensed 
optical goods again without a license and in violation of his 
probation. 
P etitioner completed high school and spcut t\yO yea rs at 
the Uniycrsity of Southcrn California in IH'c0ptomctry. lI t' 
worked for Commercial Optical Company in Omaha, Ne-
braska from 1930 to 1935. During this time he cngaged ill 
shop work (the manufacture of optical goods ) and in d is-
pcnsing (the fitting and adjusting of optical prouucts) . This 
company was not licensed as a dispensing optician, for Ne-
braska uocs not require a license of disp ensing opticians. 
From 1935 to 1942 petitioner worked for the Dietrich Opti-
cal Company in Los Angeles, which ,vas licensed as a di s-
pensing optician. Although he did some dispensillg therc, it 
appears that his primary occupation illvolved shop work. 
From 1942 to 1949 h e worked for the Superior Optical Com-
pany in Los Angeles, where he was engaged exclusively in 
shop work except for a six-month period during which he 
did dispensing work for another registered dispensing op-
tician. 
From 1949 to 1952 petitioner operated his own optical 
laboratory where he engaged solely in manufacturing. H e 
dispensed the manufactured product only occasionally when 
he went to a doctor's office to assist the dispensers therc. Fro!~ l 
1952 to 1957 he worked as a dispensing optician in the office 
. of a r egist ered ophthalmologist in Beyer]y Hi lls . 
In :March 1957 petitioner opened his own di ;: p2nsill c:- ;11 \(1 
manufacturing establishment in Beverly Hills and applied for 
a license a<; a dispensing optician. 
P etitioner admits that he does not meet the experiencc 
requirement of subdivision (a) of section 2562 of the Busin e~; :, 
and Professions Code, but urges that this sub<1ivision i;; un con-
stitutional on the ground that it imposes inequalities pro-
hibited by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the "United States COllstitntion and article T, 
sections 11 and 21 of the Constitution of the State of Cali-
fornia. 
[1] Sedio!l 2:55:2, subdiyision (a) discriminates br t\\"r l' ll 
persons who have serYed the requisitc five-year apprenticrship 
or \\'ho han been li~ensecl for five years in another state an(l 
other persons regardless of their qualifications. To eonfli c·t 
with constitutional provisions, however, the discrimination 
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"must be 'actually and palpably nnreasonable and arbitrary,' 
or the leg islative dete rmination as to what is a su ffic ient dis-
tillction to '\'arrant the classification will not be overthrown. 
[Ci tat ions. ] [2] When a legisla tive classification is q ues-
t ioned, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that 
would sustain it, there is a presumption of ('xistenee of that 
state of facts, and the burden of showing arbitrary action 
rests upon the one who assails the classification. [Citations.]" 
(People v. Western Fruit G"owers, Inc., 22 Ca1.2d 494, 506-
507 [140 P.2d 13] ; Department of Mental Hygien e v. Mc-
Gilvery, 50 Ca1.2d 742,760 [329 P.2d 689].) [3] "So long 
as the statute does not permit one to exercise the privilege 
while refusing it to another of like qualifications, under like 
conditions and circumstances, it is unobjectionable upon this 
ground." ( Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 
279, 284 [298 P . 481]. ) 
[4] .A discrimination, however, that bears no r easonable 
relation to a proper legislative obj ective is invalid. Thus, 
in Acc01l'nting Cor·p . v. State Board of Accountancy, 34 Cal. 
2d 186 [208 P .2d 984], we held unconstitutional legislation 
that permitted corporations that had been engaged in the 
practice of public accountancy for at least three years before 
the effective date of the statute to continue in business, but 
made unlawful such practice by all other corporations, be-
cause" a statute which permits some corporations to continue 
operations as public accountants while denying others that 
privilege where no reasonable grounds exist for such favori-
tism, denies equal protection to the excluded corporations and 
grants unlawful privileges to the favored ." (P. 191.) In Del 
.'lIar Cann in g Co . v. Payne, 29 Ca1.2d 380 [175 P.2d 231], 
we struck down a regulation that permitted certain fish-reduc-
tion plants to obtain operating permits but denied permits 
to others because the classification was "purely arbitrary and 
capricious, resting on no reasonable or substantial difference 
between the classes when considered in relation to the object 
of the regulation." (P. 383.) 
[5] Section 2552 is des igned to protect the public from 
incompetent and unethical opticians. \Ve are unable, howewr, 
to find any reasonable difference between the classes estab-
lished by subdivision (a ) of that section that would justify 
the discriminatiorl imposed. 
[6] Proponents of section 2552, subdivision (a) contend 
that it was reasonable for th e Legislature to impose the re-
strictive apprenticeship requirement because of conditions 
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prevalcnt in the industry. They point to the long hi ;; lory 
of abuses, of which both unscrupulous physicians and (lis-
pensing opticians have been guilty, im·olving' r ef(' rrals, re-
bates, and other unethical means of ext racting sccrct profits 
from a helpless public. Certainly such condition,; j ust i f.v 
corrective action by the Legislature, and in 1939 chapter 5.5 
of the Business and Professions Code (';;tablishpc1 a licens inq 
procedure for dispensing opticians and prohibited mislead-
ing advertising and other unethical practices. The 1947 
amendment to section 2552 of the Business and Professions 
Code requires applicants for licenses as dispensing opticians 
to demonstrate good moral character. Section 650 of the 
Business and Professions Code, enacted in 1949, prohibits un-
earned rebates, refunds and commissions as compensation for 
referrals. 
It is suggested that this history of abuses led the 
Legislature to conclude that future dispensing opticians could 
develop a proper ethical foundation for their professional 
careers only by working under the direction of licensed dis-
pensing opticians. We do not believe that the Legislature 
could reasonably have concluded that training as a dispensing 
optician acquired in a physician's office, in a college, univer-
sity, or other educational institution, in the armed services, 
or in another state not requiring a license of persons dis-
pensing optical goods, would tend to perpetuate the ethical 
abuses that have prevailed in this profession, and that such 
training acquired as an apprentice in a licensed dispensing 
establishment, or experience acquired by virtue of having been 
licensed in another state, would lead to the elimination of 
these abuses. There is a complete absence of any relationship 
between the experience requirements sought to be imposed 
and the legislative effort to correct ethical abuses in the pro-
fession. The L egislature has taken direct action against these 
abuses and may take such further action as it deems necessary, 
but it cannot r easonably be contended that the legislation in 
question bears any relation to these problems. 
[7] Proponents of sec tion 2552, subdivision (a) also con-
t end that the Legislature might reasonably have concluded 
that experience obtained under the tutelage of a licensed 
uispensing optician or experience as a licensed dispensing 
optician in a'nother state is reasonably necessary to insure 
the expertise r equired for the practice of this specialized pro-
f ession. Subdivision (a), however, requires no particular 
course of training anu imposes 110 stn nelarus for judging the 
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licensing of other states. Thus, olle who spends five years as 
an apprentice in a licensed estahlishment, 0[" as a licensee of 
another state, no matter how nan-owly limited his actual 
experience and capacity, is conclusively presumed to be more 
qualified than persons like petitioner, who have had mallY 
years of experience in dispensing and related fields but are 
given no opportunity to demonstrate their qualificat ions. Those 
who have had many years of broad experiellee in the armed 
services, in other states or foreign countries, or in the employ 
of a licensed eye physician, are prohibited from the practice 
of their chosen occupation, not because they are incompetent 
or unethical, but merely because they have not served the 
required term of apprenticeship or had the good fortune to 
work in another state that requires a license. Such arbitrary 
restrictions upon the right to work are not defensible. (Cf. 
James v. Mmoinship COl·p., 25 Cal.2d 721, 731 [155 P.2d 329, 
160 A.L.R. 900].) [8] The conclusion is inescapable that the 
experience necessary to qualify a person to dispense optical 
goods, whatever level of expertise is demanded, is obtainable 
in a variety of 'Ways. By prescribing that such experience may 
be obtained in only two ways, neither of which may r eason-
ably be thought to be superior to others, subdivision (a) con-
travenes the constitutional requirement that regruatory legis-
lation avoid arbitrary and unreasonable classifications. 
[9] The conclusion that section 2552, subdivision (a) is 
invalid is reinforced by other considerations. It confers upon 
presently licensed dispcnsing opticians the unlimited and 
unguided power to exclude from their profession any or all 
persons. [10] ""\Yhile the delegation of governmental 
authority to an administrative body is proper in some in-
stances, the delegation of absolutc legislative discretion is not. 
To avoid such a result it is necessary that a delegating statute 
establish an ascertainable standard to guide the administra-
tive body. Here the statute assumes to l!onfer legislatiye 
authority upon those who are direc tly intere;;ted in the op<.'r-
ation of the regulatory rule and its penal provisions with no 
guide for the exercise of the del<.'gaterl authority. " (State 
Board of Dry Cleanefs v. Tlmft-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc ., 40 Cal. 
2d 436, 448 [254 P.2d 29] .) The minority in the Thrift-D-LlIx 
case would have sw;tained the questioned statute because it 
conferred power upon, an administrative agency, some of whose 
members were to be appointed from the dry-cleaning industry, 
rather than upon private members of the industry at large. 
SubdivisioL. (a), however, delegates exclusionary power to 
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private members of the intlu'i try. Furtherlllore, ill the ThriJt-
D-Lux ease the statute provided some standards, held to be 
inadequate by the majority and thought by the minority to 
he sufficient. Subdivision (a) contains no guidance whatever 
for the private persons to whom power is delegated. 
[11] The absence of such standanls, or safeguards (see 
1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 2.15, pp. 148-151), 
renders effective review of the l'xr l'l:ise of the delegated power 
impossible. If section 2552, subdivision (a) is sustained, 
persons excluded from the o(;cupation of optical dispensing 
because of the refusal or licensed opticians to employ them for 
the five-year period, no matter what the reason for such re-
fusal might be, will have no remedy, for licensed opticians 
are under no duty to employ anyone, for five years or for any 
other period. :Moreoyer, presently licensed dispensing opti-
cians will be given virtually absolute economic control over 
those employees who are required to serve under them in order 
to attain future professional objectives. [12] Delegated 
power must be accompanied by suitable safeguards to guide 
its use and to protect against its misuse. (A. L. A. Schecter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 537-538 [55 
S.Ct. 837,79 L.Ed. 1570, 97 A.L.R. 947] ; Jersey Maid Milk 
Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Ca1.2d 620, 641-642 [91 P.2d 577] ; 
People v. Monterey Fish Products Co., 195 Cal. 548, 558-559 
[234 P. 398, 38 A.L.R. 1186]; see 1 Davis, Administrative 
Law Treatise, § 2.15, pp. 148-151.) 
Other jurisdictions have invalidated similar legislation. 
(Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630, 638 [34 S.Ct. 681, 58 L.Ed. 
1129, L.R.A. 1915D 677] [requiring freight conductors to 
have had experience as brakemen] ; Schroeder v. Binks, 415 
Ill. 192 [113 N.E.2d 169, 172-173] [requiring an apprentice-
ship to secure a license as a master plumber] ; People v. Brown, 
407 Ill. 565 [95 N.E.2d 88'S, 893-899] [requiring an appren-
ticeship to secure a license as a master plumber] ; People v. 
Ringe, 197 N.Y. 143 [90 N.E. 451, 454, 18 Ann.Cas. 474, 27 
L .R.A . N.S . 528] [requiring an apprenticeship to secure a 
license as an undertaker ] ; City of Sioux Falls v. Kadinger, 
73 S.D. 217 [50 N.W.2d 797, 799-S00] [requiring an appren-
ticeship to secure a license as a ma <;ter plumber] ; Hollinas-
'll'()rth Y. State Board of Barber Examincrs . 217 Ind. 373 [28 
N .E.2d 64, 67 ] [permitting 80 per cent of licensed barbers to 
fix minimum prices and opellill':!' <\111.1 do~,illg hours] ; Fink v. 
Cole, 302 N.Y. 216 [97 N.B2d S73. 8761 r d :>ll'gating to private 
jockey clubs power to license hon;e owners, trainers, and 
Jan. 1962] BLU~;E~TIL\L I'. DOA IW OI'l\IEDICAL E XA)II!-lERS 237 
r ~1 C .2Ll ::! ::~ I; 1:; C'al.~\p~r. 301. 3C3 P.2d 101] 
jO<.:kcys ] ; sec olher caSl's dis, ussl'll in 1 Davis, Admini:-;j rativc 
Law Treat ise', § 2.14, pp. 138-147. ) Defcmlant would distin-
guish these cases 011 the g rounu that they diu not involve the 
healing arts. [13] When, as here, however, a statute dis-
~l'illlilJates uet\Yeen members of different classes, and the dis-
c,'imination has no reasonable relation to the puhlic hcalth, 
safety and welfare, it must raIl \-vhether it im'olvcs the healillg 
arts or a ny other activity. 
Defendant invokes Ex pade Whitl ey, 144 CaL 167 [77 P. 
879, 1 Ann.Cas. 13 ], upllOluing a statute requiring certain 
kinds of experience for a license as a dentist. The statu te, 
however , provided three methods of acquiring the requisite 
experience, and the court !lel,1 oilly that experience or training 
was a permissible standard for determining the competency 
of an applicant for aumission to the practice of dentistry. The 
case does not stanu for the proposition that the Legislature 
may discriminate arbi trar ii:,; be tween pcrsons with the same 
experience because they have received it under conditions dif-
fering only in r espeds not r elevant to their qualifications. 
Proponents of section 2562, subuivision (a) cite other cases 
upholdillg restrictions upon the pradice of the h ealing arts 
based upon experience or training. None of these cases purport 
to foreclose invalidation of regulatory statutes that establish 
palpably unreasonable classifications. bdeed, at least one of 
the cases relied upon by the proponents of subdivision (a) 
expressly leaves open the possibility of invalidation of more 
arbitrary regulations. (P eople ex rd. Chicago D e.ntal Society 
v. A..A..A. D en tal Laboratories, Inc., 8 Ill.2d 330 [134 N.E.2d 
285, 289-290].) Others involved statutes quite different from 
subdivision (a) that appear to be eminently r easonable. 
(Mann v. Board of Medical E.raminers, 31 Cal.:2d 30, 41-42 
[187 P.2d 1] ; In re R1lst, 181 Cal. 73, 81 [183 P. 548] ; People 
v. Ratledge, 172 Cal. 401, 403, 406 [156 P . 465] ; Arwine v. 
Board of M edical E xamill ers , 151 Cal. 499, 504 [91 P . 319] ; 
People ex reI. Stepski v. Harford, 286 N.Y. 477,484-485 [36 
N.E .2d 670] ; NOl'lcood v. Parenteau, 75 S.D. 303, 311-312 
[63 N.W.2d 807].) 
[14] The invalidity of subdivision (a) of Hection 2552 
llot'S not affect the proyisions or suuc1iyision (b), \\'hich re-
lluires applicants to present affidavits establishing experience, 
good mor,:al character, and competence. The Legislature may 
require applicants for licenses as dispensing opticians to dem-
onstrate that they have these qnalities. (See Gospel Army v. 
City of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.2cl 232, 248 [163 P.2d 704] ; Ex 
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parle Whitley, S1lpra, pp. 177-178; People ex reI. Chiwgo 
Dental Society v. A.A.A. Dental Laboratories, Inc., supra, 
p. 290.) The 1939 enactmcnt regarding dispensing opti<:ialls 
contained a lengthy severability clause. Section 24 of the 
Business and Professions Code also proviJes that "If any 
provision of this code, or the application thereof, to any 
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the 
code, or the application of such provision to other persons or 
circumstances, shall not be affected thereby." [15] The 
test of severability is whether the invalid parts of the statute 
can be severed from the otherwise valid parts without destroy-
ing the statutory scheme, or the utility of the remaining pro-
visions. (Forster Shipbldg. Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 
54 Cal.2d 450, 457 [6 Cal.Rptr. 24, 353 P .2d 736J ; People v. 
McCaughan,49 Ca1.2d 409,416 [317 P.2d 974J.) The invalid-
ity of subdivision (a) in no way affects subdivision (b). Inde-
pendent parts of amendments, as well as independent parts 
of original enactments, are severable. 
Similarly, those parts of subdivision ' (a) that are not in-
valid in themselves are not affected by the only invalid 
requirement in subdivision (a), namely that experience be 
obtained " ... in an establishment or establishments of a 
dispensing optician registered under this chapter or of a dis-
pensing optician engaged in dispensing prior to the enactment 
of this chapter and thereafter registered, or who has been 
licensed as a dispensing optician for a period of five years in 
another state." Thus, the provisions of subdivision (a) de-
fining the persons of whom experience is required and specify-
ing the amount of experience necessary for registration are 
valid. Those parts of the subdivision serve a purpose in-
dependent of the purpose for which the invalid apprentice-
ship requirement was included, and can function independ-
ently of it. They are therefore severable from the invalid part 
of the subdivision. (Forst er Shipbldg. Co. v. Comity of Los 
Angeles, supra; People v. McCaughan, supra.) 
The alternative ground upon \\"hich the board r~lied in deny-
ing petitioner 's applica tion for a license \\·as that he failed to 
establish good moral character. The basis for this finding was 
that petitioner had dispensed optical goods without a license. 
When petitioner violated the statute, however, the board 
had already denied his application because he had not met the 
requirements of section 2552, subdivision (a). [16] Al-
though failure to copform to an unconstitutional regulation 
might under some circumstances bc evidence of bad character, 
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it is not here, where petitioner did not violate the statute 
until denial of his application for failure to satisfy the very 
condition that renders the regulation invalid and where the 
violations indicate no continued intention to disregard the 
law but rather an effort to establish its invalidity. 
[17] The board contends that petitioner testified falsely 
regarding the second instance of dispellsing without a license. 
The record establishes, however, that petitioner was, at most, 
confused as to the meaning of "dispensing" under the statute. 
His testimony does not appear to have been intentionally false. 
It is also suggested that petitioner is precluded by his guilty 
plea in the previous criminal action from attacking the con-
stitutionality of section 2552, subdivision (a). [ 18 ] A 
conviction for violation of an unconstitutional statute, how-
ever, may be attacked collaterally. (In 1'e Dixon, 41 Ca1.2d 
756, 762 [264 P.2d 513] ; In re B ell, 19 Ca1.2d 488, 492-495 
[122 P.2d 22].) 
[19] Petitioner has proved that he has met the require-
ment of five years' experience in optical dispensing. He has 
furnished the requisite affidavits attesting to his good moral 
character. He is therefore entitled to be licensed as a dis-
pensing optician. 
The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the 
trial court with directions to issue the writ ordering the Board 
of Medical Examiners to register petitioner as a dispensing 
optician. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February 
14,1962. 
